CERT

Our selection of alerts on honeypots: report 2 – january 2023

This last two weeks, international TEHTRIS honeypots have been under the usual massive wave of malicious activities. To be more precise, the ones located in Northeast Asia Pacific were the most targeted.

One IP conducting several malicious activities

The IP address 39.109.127[.]79 from Hong-Kong hosted by AS 142403 (YISU CLOUD LTD) performed numerous malicious activities on our honeypots targeting mainly port 80. More precisely, our honeypots detected 152 alerts the 19th of January between 7:22PM and 7:37PM (Paris time, GMT+1).

It was all about reconnaissance actions and a large range of CVE exploits was also tested, especially on the software Anywhere. 115 different URL requests have been recorded. Here are some examples :

  • CVE-2018-20062
/App/?content=die(md5(HelloThinkPHP))
  • CVE-2012-1823
/cgi-bin/php-cgi?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%66%6F%72%63%65%5F%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%3D%30+%2D%64+%63%67%69%2E%72%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%5F%73%74%61%74%75%73%5F%65%6E%76%3D%30+%2D%6E
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE) Anywhere (discovered in 2021)
/%69%73%70%69%72%69%74/%69%6D/%75%70%6C%6F%61%64%2E%70%68%70

This IP address is very little known from public databases identifying malicious IP addresses.

Precise health data are being searched out in Canada

Between the 18th and the 21st of January, 212 original requests on one honeypot hosted in Canada have captured our attention.

Those requests are coming from 10 IP addresses all unknown of public databases identifying malicious IP addresses:

IPASCountry
72.14.199[.]168
72.14.199[.]176
72.14.199[.]181
192.178.10[.]46
192.178.10[.]50
74.125.210[.]50
192.178.10[.]48
72.14.199[.]191
74.125.210[.]48
64.233.172[.]114
AS 15169 GOOGLEUS

These IP have tried to request very specific URL about Quebec region in Canada and health from GoogleDocs. Here are some examples:

/static/archives/2023-01-18_quebec_ca.html?222222
/static/archives/2023-01-20_quebec_ca.html?222222
/static/archives/2023-01-18_santemontreal.html?222222
/static/archives/2023-01-19_quebec_ca_cas-region.csv (possible research of Covid cases)
/static/archives/2023-01-20_inspq_milieux.csv?222222

This research of very specific documents on a short period of time made us believe that the person behind it knew what she was looking for and where she could find it. Unfortunately, these requests have also ended up on our honeypots…

Caution! It may not be malicious requests because it remains possible that an IT student, or an IT employee of an hospital or even a public health administration employee, had issues using a hand-made script while doing their job. This script could have been given to other colleagues, explaining the 10 different IP addresses. Behind the screen, there is a human that can make mistakes!

In the end, this is an unusual event that is difficult to assess, but that allows us to remind you the importance of better protecting health organizations  against cyber threats.

Bi-monthly statistics: Top 10 of credentials tested by cyber attackers

LoginPassword
adminadmin
rootroot
root0
root1234
345gs5662d34345gs5662d34
pipi
root0
admin7ujMko0admin
111111$passwor
root123456

Bi-monthly statistics: Top 10 of URL requested used by cyber criminals

URL
l9bjkkhaycw6f8f4.soundcloud.com:443
/.git/config
/hm/capwap/index.html?NODEID=F09CE932A4C0
/hm/capwap/index.html?NODEID=E01C41B18940
/hm/capwap/index.html?NODEID=E01C41B19780
/hm/capwap/index.html?NODEID=4018B1F83880
/boaform/admin/formLogin
/hm/capwap/index.html?NODEID=4018B1CA4DC0
/_ignition/execute-solution
/hm/capwap/index.html?NODEID=4018B1E369C0

Bi-monthly statistics : Top 10 of ports targeted by malicious cyber groups

Port
445
22
80
23
6379
443
8443
5555
3389
81

Unknown IoCs

The solution Deceptive Response with Web and SMB modules allows us to record attacks performed against our honeypots and to collect data from the attackers. These IP addresses have been monitored performing attacks on our international network of honeypots during these past two weeks. What is their common feature? They are all unknown from public databases identifying malicious IP addresses.

IPASCountryAttack
109.237.96[.]124AS 202306 Hostglobal.plus LtdRUWeb Service
109.237.97[.]141 AS 202306 Hostglobal.plus LtdRUWeb Service
37.153.250[.]65AS 28685 Routit BVNLWeb Service
202.157.176[.]224AS 136170 PT. EXABYTES NETWORK INDONESIAMYWeb Service
95.214.235[.]205AS 30860 Virtual Systems LLCUAWeb Service
85.27.52[.]68AS 12392 Brutele SCBEWeb Service
112.47.34[.]246AS 9808 China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd.CNWeb Service
185.254.196[.]115AS 30860 Virtual Systems LLCUSWeb Service
47.242.80[.]60AS 45102 Alibaba US Technology Co., Ltd.HKProtocol SMB
118.99.67[.]110AS 17451 BIZNET NETWORKSIDProtocol SMB
222.255.122[.]62AS 7643 Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications VNPTVNProtocol SMB
80.234.105[.]221AS 12389 RostelecomRUProtocol SMB
103.113.85[.]138AS 135307 Golden TMH Telecom Co. LtdMMProtocol SMB
122.53.126[.]30AS 9299 Philippine Long Distance Telephone CompanyPHProtocol SMB
202.88.240[.]215AS 17465 Cable ISP in IndiaINProtocol SMB
187.230.132[.]23AS 8151 Uninet S.A. de C.V.MXProtocol SMB
189.203.208[.]115AS 22884 TOTAL PLAY TELECOMUNICACIONES SA DE CVMXProtocol SMB